

INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY DEPT.

FILE PERIOD 1963-1965		PART
FILE TITLE		FILE NUMBER
1920 JIC ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN BRUNE!		ISD 56/22/01
INDEX HEADINGS		
JOINT INTELLIGENCE BRIDE		
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RELATED FILES :--

150) 56/22/01 - 1960-62 - as title

CROSS REFERENCED UNDER :-

North wil. Whe to m. Hamis 28/1 then forting 45 by TIC していり 24, 2 12.8/1 n. Shegog . 29/1 To see 1/2. This is the first of a series of tortnightly appreciations produced by the J.I.C. for the C.O.S. Exhaut Tic (Weekly menus) Extract from Jic Weakly Review of - 12-2-63
Current Intelligence H JICFE 39 25-1-63 5 JICFE SI 12-2-63 2-5. Put her In future te forenique by apprecaulions for the c.o.s. mule se induded in the Red Soule. They mill not be circulated reparatily by De c.o.s. seemelaniet.

6. JICFE 55 19-2-63 7. SICFE 52 8. Extract from JIC(63)12th meeting munutes m. Rumming Bruce wo see /8 !9/3 R. Harris 11/3. 9. Extract From Jic Weekly Review of Current Intalligerae = 12-3-63 10 SEACOS 8-3-63 2. Hambo avan \$18/3 2. Shegog 18/3 To me. 9 -10. Le Thous.

11. Extract from Jic Weekby Review of Current Intelligence - 26-3-63

Mr. Hamis

Mr. Lagay V 29/3

To see (11) May Higham to see. The unknown origin of many of the shotgums is the first possible tie-up I have seen unter Peraltais allegation and the barter of agareties on Sunaggluj for auno. New Sherry 19/3 22-3-63 12 JIC(FE) 70/63 (final) minument that m. Shegoy. Vul4 13 510 271/63 JIC/272/63 15-4-63 m. Haghan Mig/4 pr. amitye-suite (m setuin). wy stuggers

To see (13) 2 (14).

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Mr. Armitage Smith 1/22/4 Mr. Ske gog. v 23/4 Lusseels min of 14/4. Jic (FE) 85/63 (Fonal.) 17.4.63 16 Extract from The Westly Remind of line. 23.6.63 n. Higham To see 15 o-16. (15) is an interesting and disquieting assessment. Monis 25/4 Mi Hogham showed see (15) today in reforme to two PQs down for next Therday. The insersment is be-is proved right by events. But it seems very probable from reforts of the Tebeda whidest that there has been a ving deliberate attempt by the attacker to

Inthrèse thenselves as TNKU

No Shenn 26/4

Ar. Pricell

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Intélligence - 23-4-63

FAR EAST

now 7,100 25/4.

BORNEO TERRITORIES (SECRET)

- 9. In continuing operations against the Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO) in Western Sarawak Security Forces have recovered 5,017 shotguns between 19th and 21st April.
- 10. The second of the isolated raids which have been expected against the Borneo Territories occurred on 23rd April, when a party of five marine commandos and one police constable were attacked at Gumbang, about 25 miles north-west of Tebedu and about half a mile from the Indonesian border, in Western Sarawak. The attackers, who remain unidentified, were armed with automatic weapons, shotguns, and home-made grenades, opened fire from 20-30 yards' range, and one marine was slightly wounded. The fire was returned, and the attackers, thought to number about eight, withdrew towards the Indonesian border, leaving a trail of blood.

A Amitage. Smith

NOTE

The attached paper is circulated by the Secretary Joint Intelligence Committee for information and record.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

2 2 APR 1963 1967

SLIP B

SPECIAL CARE
2 4 APR 1963

FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (FAR EAST)

JIC(FE)85/63(Final)

Y NO.

17th April, 1963

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (FAR EAST)

ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN SARAWAK AS AT 16TH, APRIL, 1963

Note by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)

INCIDENT AT TEBEDU, WEST SARAWAK, ON 12TH APRIL, 1963

General

1. This was probably the first of the expected pattern of Indonesian inspired incidents designed to cause unrest in the Borneo Territories with the aim of disrupting Malaysia (see recent agreed assessment+ of Indonesian involvement up to 31st August, 1963). It could also be an attempt to give the impression that militant opposition to Malaysia, hitherto represented by the TNKU revolt, now exists not only in the area of Brunei and East Sarawak but also in other parts of Borneo, and to impress international opinion with this fact.

Identity of Attackers

All the evidence available points to the conclusion that the attackers came from Kalimantan. It is possible that they were members of
General Zulkifli's so-called Sarawak National Army which may now be considering itself as part of the TNKU. There is no evidence that the incident was linked with the CCO.

Likelihood of Future Incidents

As this is believed to be first of the expected pattern of Indonesian inspired incidents against the Borneo Territories, it is likely that similar incidents will follow at widely dispersed points. West Sarawak, because of its case of access from Kalimantan, is the most sensitive area. Targets will probably include security force posts, Government offices and installations, and individuals and groups known to be sympathetic towards Malaysia.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CCO MILITANT WING IN SARAWAK

General

- Information recently obtained from the interrogation of CCO members in detention shows that the organisation and training of the militant wing of the CCO may have progressed further than previously believed. It is now considered that the CCO may already be in a position to start armed action.
- + Annex to CISC/Minutes/4

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JIC(FE)85/63(Final)

- 2 -

State of Organisation and Training

- There is evidence that guerilla companies each of about 30 men are being raised and trained at Branch Committee level in the 1st Division of Sarawak. There are 47 Branch Committees, thus making a potential of about 1400 armed men in that division alone. It is assessed that perhaps one third of these are now organised and training. There is evidence that members of one of the guerilla companies possesses three rifles and one automatic weapon. There are large numbers of shot-guns in Sarawak with which the CCO could arm themselves. Training in field-craft weapon handling and jungle fighting has been carried out.
- 6. It must be assumed that a similar pattern of armed organisation exists in the 2nd and 3rd Divisions. CCO militant organisation is most evident in the 1st Division and in the Sibu Lower Rejang area of the 3rd Division. There is some CCO activity in the 2nd Division particularly in the Simmangang area. Throughout the territory there are some thousands of supporters belonging to the Sarawak Farmers' Association.

Likely Targets

7. In their present state of readiness, the CCO armed companies may select for attack targets such as police posts and security force patrols. They may also engage in sabotage and attempt the murder of Europeans.

Timing

8. It is believed that the CCO consider that they missed their opportunity in not starting armed revolt at the time of the Brunei rebellion despite their military unpreparedeness. Although the CCO are probably already sufficiently prepared to start armed insurrection in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions of Sarawak, they may consider that it would serve their purposes best to wait a further month or two to improve their training and to acquire further rifles and automatic weapons. However, a further incident of the Tebedu type might cause them to act sooner.

R.G.A. ETHERINGTON-SMITH

C.R. SIMS

H.N.D. FLETCHER

D.II. CHRISTIE

C.L. HERBERT

P.D. VAIGNCOURT-STRALLEN (for A.W. COWPER)

J.B. HAMPSHIRE (for D. IVESON)

HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND

Distribution: - Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)
Joint Intelligence Committee (London)
Joint Secretaries, Combined Intelligence Staff Committee
Secretary, Joint Territories Intelligence Committee
Commissioner for Australia in Singapore
Commissioner for New Zealand in Singapore

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J.I.C./272/63

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

BORNEO TERRITORIES

The Far East Sector, Heads of Sections met on Monday, 15th April, 1963 to review the situation in the Borneo Territories. The following is their report.

- 2. No further incidents have been reported from the Borneo Territories since the attack on Tebedu Police Station discussed in our assessment of 12th April.
- 3. The Governor of Sarawak, however thinks that there is evidence that the Clandestine Communist Organisation (C.C.O.) is preparing for armed insurrection. He estimates their fighting strength in Western Sarawak at 1400 men at most.
- 4. The Governor is now planning an operation, with military support, to disrupt the C.C.O. and to confiscate firearms in their areas.
- 5. Since our last report further evidence has strengthened the view that the Tebedu attackers come from Indonesia, but it remains uncertain whether they acted on the orders of the Indonesian Government, of the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.) or (with at least the tacit connivance of the local Indonesian authorities) on the initiative of General Kipli of the North Kalimantan National army (T. N.K.U.). So far, however, there has been no comment on the incident from official Indonesian sources or even from Radio Kalimantan Utara (the clandestine broadcasting station in Djakarta). This suggests that the Indonesian Government is still unwilling to accept responsibility for the raid. Nor is there any evidence of a connexion between the raid and the plans of the C.C.O. If this existed we would expect the link to be with the P.K.I. rather than with the Indonesian Government, but it is also conceivable that there are two quite independant plans, one organised by the C.C.O. from within Sarawak and one organised from inside Indonesia. Further evidence will be needed before any conclusion is possible.

N. Kensell

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SECRET

6. There is still no evidence of changes in Indonesian military dispositions or preparations for overt attack. Ilthough there may well be further isolated raids of this kind, we do not think there has been any fundamental change in the Indonesian threat as we have assessed it. There has, however, been a definite deterioration within Sarawak itself, where the threat from the C.C.O. has considerably increased during the last few weeks.

(Signed) J.C. ROPER

Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

15th April, 1963.

This appreciation has been telegraphed to the following:-

C.I.A. Washington, J.I.R. Ottawa, S.S.R. Paris, ACOS(I) S.CLANT, Secretary J.I.C. Far East, U.K. Delegation to U.N., New York; British Embassics Washington, Paris, Djakarta and Manila; U.K. Delegation to N.TO, BDLS Canberra and Wellington (for Australian and N.Z. Authorities): and by C.R.O. to British High Commissioners Canberra, Wellington and Kuala Lampur (For Malayans).

Scen by w. Wallac.

COPY NO. 49

J.I.C./271/63

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

16 APR 1963

S.R.W.K

The Far East Sector Heads of Sections met at 5 p.m. on Good Friday 12th April, 1963, to review the situation in Sarawak and the following is their report.

- 2. A Police Station at Tebedu, three miles from the Indonesian border in western Sarawak, was attacked on the night of 11th April by about 60 armed, uniformed men. One policeman was killed and two wounded. The attackers withdrew towards the Indonesian border after an hour, taking with them the weapons from the Police Station and some of the ammunition.
- 3. The Police Station has since been occupied by a military patrol from Serian and other British reinforcements are on their way to western Sarawak.
- 4. No incidents have been reported elsewhere in the Borneo territory. No evidence is yet available to identify the attackers, though a TNKU badge was found and a police constable thought that they had Indonesian accents. If the raid came from across the Indonesian border, this might fit in with an unconfirmed report from: suggesting that General Kipli (one of the TNKU leaders, who has been in Indonesia for some time) had been authorised to undertake sporadic and isolated actions against British security forces in Sarawak so that the Indonesian confrontation policy could be nurtured by some guerilla activity to create the impression of widespread opposition to Malaysia.
- 5. We have no evidence of any changes in Indonesian military dispositions, nor is there evidence to suggest that any form of overt attack is imminent.
- 6. We do not know enough at present to reach any firm conclusions about the nature or significance of this attack. If it came from Indonesia, however, it would be quite consistent with the pattern of covert operations we have always envisaged, and similar attacks might be mounted at any time at other parts of the border between British and Indonesian territory.

(Signed) J.C... ROPER

Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

12th april, 1963

This appreciation has been telegraphed to the following:-

C.I.... Washington, J.I.R. Ottawa, S.S.R. Paris, .. COS(I) S.CL.NT, Secretary J.I.C. Far East, U.K. Delegation to U.N., New York; British Embassies Washington, Paris, Djakarta and Manila; U.K. Delegation to NATO, BDLS Canberra and Wellington (for Australian and N.Z. ..uthorities); and by CRO to British High Commissioners Canberra, Wellington and Kuala Lumpur (for Malayans, less last contoucc of naragraph 4) SECRET

THIS IS A COPY THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 NOTE

The attached paper is circulated by the Secretary Joint Intelligence Committee for information and record.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

1963

SLIP B

FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (FAR EAST)

JIC(FE)70/63(Final)

COPY NO.....

22

22nd March, 1963

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (FAR EAST)

FORTNIGHTLY UK ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE BORNEO TERRITORIES

Note by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)

We have approved at Annex an assessment which may be used by the UK members of the Combined Intelligence Staff Committee as a basis for discussion with the Malayans on 25th March, 1963.

A.W. COWPER

C.R. SIMS

D. IVESON

H.M.D. FLETCHER

D.M. CHRISTIE

C.R. HILL

E.G.W. BROWNE (for C.A. HERBERT)

HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND

Distribution: - Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)

SECRET

Annex to JIC(FE)70/63(Final)

CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE BORNEO TERRITORIES FOR COMBINED INTELLIGENCE STAFF MEETING ON 25TH MARCH, 1963

General

1. There has been no significant change in the situation.

Military

- The number of TNKU rebels still unaccounted for is now less than 100. Several of the leaders still at large including Jassin Affendi are reported to be sick and Sheik Osman (Azahari's brother) is reported to be in command of the group which is still on the move in the Panduaran road area.
- In Kalimantan no significant deployments of Indonesian troops or "volunteers" have been noted.

Political

- A new radio station, the Freedom Radio of North Kalimantan, started daily broadcasting, probably from Djakarta, at the beginning of March. It broadcasts from 1130 to 1330 hours GMT on 11,940 kilocycles. Its propaganda, in English and Malay and one broadcast in Iban is designed to stir up trouble in the Malaysian territories. Talks by Azahari and General Zulkifli have been broadcast and repeated by the Indonesian press and radio. Reception is generally good in Sarawak but indifferent in Brunei.
- 5. The proposal by President Macapagal for a SE Asian summit conference has produced some relaxation in the propaganda war and a general move towards preliminary low-level contacts between officials of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya. It seems unlikely that overall agreement will be reached between the three countries, whose aims are divergent, but some minor causes of disagreement might be removed.

Communism in Sarawak

6. A recent assessment gives the strength of the CCO in Sarawak as at least 1,000 members of whom approximately 250 are cadres. It is considered likely that these would form the nucleus of an armed force if an armed struggle replaced the CCO's present constitutional policy. There is evidence that the CCO are now trying to condition their sympathisers to accept the idea of an armed struggle. The CCO led peasant organisation probably numbers about 8,000 and is spread throughout Sarawak except in the 5th Division. The main strength of the CCO is in the 1st and 3rd Divisions.

Extract from Jic weeksty France 26-3-63

BORNEO TERRITORIES (SECRET)

- 20. During the last fortnight the Security Forces have continued patrolling and ambushing with satisfactory results. A number of rebels have been captured, killed or have surrendered, including several leaders with prices on their heads. Unarrested TNKU personnel seem mostly to be located in the Limbang and Temburong areas of Brunei and are now estimated to total 90, of whom no more than 15 are significant leaders.
 - 21. In all 3,788 rebels have been captured, killed or have surrendered. Of the weapons which were captured by the rebels from the police and from civilians, all but the following have been recovered: 1 LMG, 4 SMGs, 7 ·303 rifles, and 9 other firearms. A total of 2,405 shot guns have been captured or taken in by the security forces. The origin of many of these weapons is unknown, but where they were the property of loyal citizens, a re-issue has now been made.

CONFIDENTIAL

An Russell # 10

UNITED KINGDOM SECURITY WARNINGS

1. Category AC telegram. Paraphrase NOT required.

- 2. A telegram which contains a reference to any classified telegram or correspondence must itself be classified.
- 3. The Ministry of Defence Cypher Office must be consulted if it is desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a person or nation who would not normally be authorised to receive it.

FROM: CINC FAREAST

TO: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE LONDON

PRIORITY

IZ 4671 TOO 080635Z TOR 081121Z

INFO: FOCINCFEF (FLAG)

FOCINCFEF (R/L)

HQ FEAF FARELF

SEACOS 102

8th March, 1963.

For CDS.

SITREP as at 080500Z.

No further captures of rebels but quantity arms and ammo recovered in Seria area including one sten gun.

2. Woodbridge Haven and two CMS withdrawn from Brunei Bay andredeployed for forthcoming anti-piracy operation NE Borneo. 081215GH.

CIRCULATION

T00 080635Z

P.S. to Prime Minister

P.S. to Secretary of State for Colonies

P.S. to Secretary of State for C.R.U.

COS (Normal)

Mr. P.A. Wilkinson, F.O.

Mr. J. Cable, S.E. Asia Dept., F.O.

Extrack From J.1.C. Westery Reviews of current

htelligerce - 12-3-63

FAR EAST

THE BORNEO TERRITORIES AND INDONESIA (SECRET)

19. Military and police operations in the Northern Territories continue. The TNKU strength has now been assessed at less than 200, mainly dispersed in the Temburong area. Six terrorists were killed and 31 were captured in the first week of March 1963.

20. Indonesian propaganda attacks on Malaysia have recently abated. However, on 4th March a new radio station, Radio Kalimantan Utara, started broadcasting. This station is presumably based on Indonesian territory, and is being used by Azahari and other rebels as a vehicle for anti-Malaysian propaganda and for stirring up dissident elements within the territories. The various statements over this radio station are being given even wider dissemination by the Indonesian official news agency.

8

Extract from Jic (63)12th meeting munites

- 7-3-63

CONFIDENTIAL

2. THE SITUATION IN THE BORNEO TERRITORIES

(Previous Reference: J.I.C. (63) 7th Meeting, Item. 7)

The Committee were informed of a possible requirement for a report on the probable extent and duration of the present emergency in Borneo, in order to enable the Chiefs of Staff to determine its effect on certain contingency plans.

It was agreed in discussion that it would be difficult to add to what was said in the current series of assessments of the Borneo situation prepared fortnightly for the Chiefs of Staff; but that the latest assessment of the situation as seen by the J.I.C. (Far East) (in telegram JICFE 52 of 6th March) should be drawn to their attention.

The Committee:-

Instructed the Secretary to inform the Chiefs of Staff accordingly.

UNITED KINGDOM SECURITY WARNINGS

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FROM: CINC FAREAST

TO : CABINET OFFICE LONDON

PRIORITY

IZ 4480 TOU 060451Z TOR 061006Z

JICFE 52

6th March, 1963.

For Secretary, JIC.

References: (A) JICFE 42 paragraph 3.

(B) JIC 90. (54) 151) 56 91 01

- Assessment of the Borneo Territories situation as at 4 Mar 63 agreed at UK/Malayan Combined Intelligense Staff Meeting is given below.
- 2. General. There has been little change in the situation during the last three weeks. Indonesian anti-Malaysian propaganda increased during the middle of Feb but has since practically returned to its usual level. However Indonesian broadcasts and rumour spreading still continue to try to affect the morale of the population in the Border Area of Sarawak.
- To Tokku Rebellion. There have been no recent rebel-instigated actions. The remaining Tokku strength is assessed as less than 200. Jassim Effendi and one or two other leaders remain at large but on the move in the Temburong Area. There have been several surrenders of junior officers and NOO's and more weapons are being recovered.
- 4. CCO in Sarawak. The strength of the CCO is now assessed at about 2000. Its policy of trying to win more support among farmers continues.
- Indonesian infiltration. One isolated incident has come to light in which two cr three Indonesians have been attempting to give rudimentary drill instruction to Malays in a Coastal Area in the 1st Division of Sarawak. The Indonesians returned to Kalimantan in mid-Feb.
- 6. Indonesian military activity. There is still no evidence of any major Indonesian military reinforcement of Kalimantan, nor of any preparation for any major offensive. Summary of Indonesian intentions.

7. Combined assessment is that: -

(A) Indonesian hostility to Malaysia will probably lead to an adoption of some of the tactics similar to those already used to acquire West New Guinea.

(B) These will involve an attempt to force the question of Malaysia on to the international scene and win support for existing opposition to Malaysia.



(C) In order to focus international concern it will be necessary for the Indonesians to continue to make provocative and belligerent statements and to create incidents, dissension and fear in the Borneo Territories and Malaysia as a whole.

(D) Small groups could be infiltrated into the Eorneo Territories to engage in acts of terrorism, sabotage, a subversion and intimidation. Their success would be less important to the Indonesians than their presence.

(E) an overt military attack against the Borneo Territories is unlikely before the planned date of Malaysia and preparations for such an attack would almost certainly be detected.

8. Next Meeting will be held in Kuala Lumpur 25 Mar 63.

CIRCULATION

TOU 060451Z

JIC (Normal)

CONFIDENTIAL

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UNITED KINGDOM SECURITY WARNINGS

- 1. Category AC telegram. Paraphrase NOT required.
- 2. A telegram which contains a reference to any classified telegram or correspondence must itself be classified.
- 3. The Ministry of Defence Cypher Office must be consulted if it is desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a person or nation who would not normally be authorised to receive it.

FROM: CINCFAREAST

TO: MOD, LONDON



PRIORITY

IZ 4099 TOO 010750Z TOR 011517Z

Reference DEF 521* dtg 281617Z herewith repetition of JICFE 55

Begins.

FROM: CINC FAREAST

T00 190840Z/Feb.

TO : CABINET OFFICE

JICFE 55

19th February, 1963.

For Secretary JIC.

Reference JIC 90. 54156

Next UK/Malayan meeting will not be held 25 February which is a Muslim holiday. New date will be 4 March at which situation up to 2nd March will be discussed. Agreed assessment will be telegraphed to you as soon as possible after meeting. Hope this acceptable.

CIRCULATION

TOO 010750Z

JIC (Normal)

Note by D.M.C.

*OZ 2540 circulated to Secretary J.I.C. only

Category AC telegram. Paraphrase NOT required.

A telegram which contains a reference to any classified telegram or correspondence must itself be classified.

The Ministry of Defence Cypher Office must be consulted if it is desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a person or nation who would not normally be authorised to receive it.

: CINC FAR EAST

TO CABINET OFFICE

2913 T00 120810Z TOR 121718Z

JICFE 51

12th February, 1963.

Reference JIC 90. SK(151) 56 2101

Assessment of North Borneo Territories situation as at 8th February, 1963 agreed at U.K./Malay Combined Intelligence Staff Meeting 11th February is given below.

General.

Security operations continue to eliminate the remnants of the TNKU and are also designed to acquire warring of the entry of infiltrators into the North Borneo territories.

Cover Threat.

- There has been no action initiated by the TNKU for some four to five weeks. The TNKU main leaders, including Jassin Effendi, and the few rank and file still at large, represent the most immediate internal threat to the security of the North Borneo territories. Without outside assistance the TNKU represents a small threat at present.
- The threat from the CCO is not so immediate but is probably more dangerous than that of the TNKU. The CCO is an efficient organisation whose size and following are increasing. At present, indications are that it's policy is to continue the constitutional struggle for as long as possible. However, a section of the CCO is demanding a resort to arms, although it is admitted that this cannot be done while they lack arms and military training and the organisation itself is making preparations for an "armed struggle" should it's consitutional method fail. Provision of external aid, for instance, from the PKI to the CCO. and the arrival of Indonesian infiltrators in the North Borneo territories might precipitate a CCO "armed struggle".

So far there has been (no?) sign of an Indonesian infiltration. However, training and preparations for such infiltration continue, and are assessed to be far enough advanced for it to begin on a small scale at any time. Crossing points in Western Sarawak particularly in Lubok Antu seem most likely to be used first.

Overt Threat.

- There is still no evidence of Indonesian military reinforcement of Kalimantan. Military activities in Kalimantan itself indicate that so far the Indonesians have been strengthening their frontier security and their means of surveillance. For these purposes they have used local infantry to units of the Police Mobile Brigade.
- 7. There is no evidence of Indonesian air activity over the Borneo territories or of patrol activity along the border with Kalimantan. There is no evidence of preparation being made for jet aircraft to be based in Kalimantan.
- 8. We still consider that the overall state of Indonesian military preparedness and the present political considerations make overt operations unlikely in the near future. Military activities in Kalimantan itself and in the other parts of Indonesia are being closely watched.
- 9. Since assessment was agreed we have had several COMBRITBOR reports of single piston aircraft over the North Borneo territories. These aircraft remain unidentified.
- 10. Date of next routine CISC meeting will be 4th March, 1963.

CIRCULATION

T00 120810Z

JIC (Normal)

Ar Rinnett

1. Category AC telegram. Paraphrase not required.

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3. The Ministry of Defence Cypher Office must be consulted if it is desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a person or nation who would not normally be authorised to receive it.

FROM: CINC FAR EAST

TO: CABINET OFFICE, LONDON

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IZ 1624 TOU 251515Z TOR 251805Z

JICFE 39.

25th January 1963.

For Secretary, JIC.
Reference JIC 68.

1. JIC(FE)15/63 was sent to London in bag today. It is a Brief which was given to CINCFE on 22nd January. Appropriate extracts follow. Other information contained in Brief has already been sent to you in preceding papers and signals.

2. Indonesian attitude.

- A. The Indonesians are determined to wreck Malaysia. We cannot forecast how quickly and how far they are prepared to go to achieve their aim. Although they had a hand in preparation of the Brunei revolt they were surprised at the timing and are still reluctant to be the first to give open support to Azahari.
- B. Their ultimate aim is to absorb the Borneo Territories into Indonesia but in the first instance they would probably be content to see an independent State composed of the Borneo Territories which is not aligned with Malaysia or the U.K.
- C. It seems unlikely that they will let matters rest now. Although they have not formally recognised Azahari's Government in any way, they are fairly deeply committed to support a movement such as his. They have lew illusions about him or his army but it does give them a good starting point from which to work internationally, through the Afro-Asian Bloc, against Malaysia. They may need to foment trouble in the Borneo Territories to lend roint to their international moves. This may be done secretly and there are some signs of preparation for such action.
- D. Internally the Indonesian Government is beset with enormous economic difficulties (including food shortages), Communistparty aspirations for a wider share in the Government, and the see-saw power-balancing act which Soekarno maintains between the PKI and the army.

- The Government may soon need another external distraction to rally the population and the conflicting power groups and to occupy the attention of their large armed forces. The organisation of disturbances in the Borneo Territories is now probably high on their list of possible external distractions.
 - E. Covert action it would appear that the Indonesians have already decided to take action in the Borneo Territories. The easiest way for them to do so would be by clandestine means. At any time now they may attempt to:-
 - (a) Stir up further unrest in Brunei, possibly in Sarawak through the CCO or possibly in North Borneo through the large Indonesian population there.

(b) Infiltrate small parties of armed men by land, sea or air.

- (c) Create staging areas in the vicinity of the border for large scale infiltration by groups of insurgents/
- F. Overt action in less they seriously miscalculate the consequences the Indonesians would be most unlikely to take deliberate overt military action in the Borneo Territories before Malaysia. Apart from obvious political considerations and their lack of military preparations, they would probably assess that they have more to gain by confining their activities to the clandestine field.
- 7. Philippine attitude.

This is still developing. Philippine Government support for Azahari was never publicly expressed. Before the rebellion there was contact between the President of the Philippines and Soekarno which produced some agreed attitude towards the Borneo Territories. Soekarno has recently reminded Macapagal of this. Since the rebellion, as a result of the U.K.'s decision to hold talks with the Philippine Government, the latters attitude has been more friendly towards the U.K. The talks will show whether the Filipinos can be convinced that Malaysia will be in a position to provide adequate defence for North Borneo. They are also reported to be apprehensive of Communist influence spreading from Singapore to the Borneo Territories and specially North Borneo. In addition they are now more apprehensive of Indonesian intentions. Nonetheless there are a number of politicians who have made an issue of the Philippine claim to North Borneo and have invested in it, they and the Government will need some face-saving device for dropping the claim. The present trend of Philippine Government thinking is in favour of continued U.K./Malaysian Defence interest in North Borneo rather than Indonesian occupation or influence there. The recent assessment of Indonesian intentions by the Philippine Minister of Defence seems to be based on no more information than that which is svailable to us. The Philippine attitude will crystallise after the London talks.

CIRCULATION

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Extract from JIC Weekly Reviews of authort Intelligence -12-2-63.

BORNEO TERRITORIES (CONFIDENTIAL)

13. The only significant development has been Dr. Subandrio's statement on 11th February in which he declared Indonesia's official opposition to the Malaysia plan. He also said that any extension to the Borneo territories of the Tunku's hostility to Indonesia could, in view of the long common land frontier, result in "incidents of physical conflict". This marks a further step in the Indonesian war of nerves against Malaya, for the Indonesian Government have hitherto denied that they were opposed in principle to the creation of Malaysia. On the other hand, there is nothing to suggest that Indonesian intervention, whether overt or covert, is any more imminent than before.

FAR EAST

BORNEO TERRITORIES (SECRET)

- 2. The military situation is unchanged.
- 3. With the assistance of the Indonesian Embassy in Manila, Azahari has managed to travel to Djakarta. Recent reports show that the Indonesians are continuing with their plans to frustrate the formation of Malaysia. At the same time, the Indonesian Government are trying to avoid any action on which we could seriously take issue and are exercising some restraint in their public statements.
- 4. The recent Anglo-Philippine talks in London have failed to discourage the Filipinos from supporting the Indonesians against Malaysia. An exchange of visits between Indonesian and Philippine leaders is probable and the two Governments may join in making trouble for us at the United Nations. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that the Philippine Government are prepared to permit the despatch of volunteers to the Borneo territories or to play an active part in fomenting further disturbances there.



COPY NO. 63

CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF FIRST SEA LORD C.I.G.S.

Copy to: Mr. A.P. Hockaday, Ministry of Defence
Mr. P.A. Wilkinson, Foreign Office
Mr. J. Cable, Foreign Office
Major-General C.R. Price, Commonwealth
Relations Office
Mr. J.N.A. Armitage-Smith, Colonial Office
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee

REFERENCE: COS.1125/21/1/63

THE SITUATION IN THE BORNEO TERRITORIES - JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE APPRECIATION

At your meeting* on 8th January, 1963, you invited the Joint Intelligence Committee to produce an appreciation on the situation in the Borneo Territories at fortnightly intervals.

2. Attached, accordingly, is the first such appreciation, which was approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee at their meeting on Thursday, 17th January, 1963.

J.K. WATKINS

Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

21st JANUARY, 1963

* COS 1st Meeting/63, Minute 2

ANNEX TO COS.1125/21/1/63

THE SITUATION IN THE BORNEO TERRITORIES JIC APPRECIATION

There has been no rebel violence in the Borneo territories. Cordon and search operations have continued in Sarawak and Brunei. Several groups of rebels totalling about 100 have been sighted in the Temburong and Limbang areas. Over 40 rebels have been arrested or have surrendered since 8th January and searches have revealed a number of hidden shot guns and ammunition. All is quiet in North Borneo, where the pro-Malaysia parties won a sweeping victory in local government elections.

- 2. There are still no indications that the Indonesian Government are planning to give overt support to the remaining rebels. However, recent reports indicate that the Indonesian Government would like to raise the matter in the United Nations if they could secure the co-operation of the Philippines Government. The latter are unlikely to fall in with Indonesian wishes, at any rate until after the Anglo/Philippine talks, due to begin on 24th January.
- 3. Apart from an increase in the activities of Fadillah, Azahari's representative in Indonesia, there has been no change in the situation in Indonesia. Indeed, unconfirmed secret reports suggest that preparations for eventual covert intervention may already have begun in Kalimantan.
- 4. Our provisional conclusions remain the same: that overt military intervention is unlikely in the near future and that the Indonesians must be expected to profit from any opportunity for covert action which offers itself. However, diplomatic intervention would now appear to depend on the outcome of the Anglo/Philippine talks which might also influence the Indonesian attitude towards covert assistance to the remaining rebels.

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